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American common law has long endeavored to "promote[ ] the even-
handed, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster[ ]
reliance on judicial decisions, and contribute[ ] to the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process."' CLS Bank International v. Alice Corpora-
tion2 presented the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, with a
prime opportunity to promote the predictable and consistent application of
patent law principles, by delineating a proper test to apply when determining
whether an invention is patent eligible under § 101 of the Patent Act.3 Specif-
ically, the issues on appeal in this case related to computer-implemented in-
ventions. The court was tasked with: (1) identifying which test to adopt when
"determin[ing] whether a computer-implemented invention is a patent ineli-
gible 'abstract idea;"' (2) determining under what circumstances, if any, "the
presence of a computer in a claim lend[s] patent eligibility to an otherwise
patent-ineligible idea;" and (3) deciding whether classification of a claim as a
method, system, or storage medium should affect assessment of patent eligi-
bility under § 101.4
This en banc decision resulted in no majority opinion, rather five frac-
tured opinions, along with "additional reflections" filed by Chief Judge Ra-
der. These diverse opinions indicate the Court's struggle to agree on how to
apply the law in determining patent eligibility. As the only appellate court
that hears patent eligibility and enforcement cases, the Federal Circuit Court
is in the best position to interpret what is and is not patent-eligible subject
matter. By failing to establish a clear standard, the Court's opinions prevent
attorneys from confidently advising their clients, and jeopardize the even-
handedness, predictability, and consistency of the application of patent law.
I. PARTIES AND PATENTS IN DISPUTE
The Appellees in this rehearing en banc were CLS Bank International,
an Edge Act corporation located in New York, and CLS Services Ltd., a
t The issue in this case note was preempted on June 19, 2014 when the Supreme
Court decided Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l et al. SMU Science and
Technology Law Review acknowledges the scholarship of the author through
publication.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of
Law and full-time employee of one of the amici curiae.
1. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
2. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en
banc).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
4. CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1293 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
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United Kingdom corporation.5 CLS Bank International is statutorily author-
ized to engage in international banking activities, as regulated by the U.S.
Federal Reserve and "in a cooperative oversight arrangement with the central
banks whose currencies are settled by CLS Bank."6 CLS Services Ltd. pro-
vides technical and operational support to CLS Bank.7 The purpose of CLS is
to mitigate settlement risk for foreign currency exchange transactions by op-
erating a large multicurrency cash settlement system, 8 in which CLS "en-
sur[es] that both parties have fulfilled their respective obligations before
directing the exchange of currencies."9
The Appellant, Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. ("Alice"), is an Australian
company. National Australia Bank Limited is a fifty percent shareholder in
Alice,o and incidentally a member bank of CLS."1 Alice is "an innovator in
financial markets," and offers its intellectual property for licensing.12 Alice
owns five patents in dispute, each of which relate to a trading platform that
mitigates settlement risk in a financial transaction between two parties by
using a trusted third party to settle the transaction.13 The claims evaluated by
the court relate to "methods of exchanging obligations between parties," data
processing systems, and computer-readable storage media containing pro-
gram code for directing an exchange of obligations.14
II. CLS'S CLAIMS
Shortly after CLS began operations in 2002, Alice advised CLS of its
apparent infringement of Alice's patents and offered a license.15 Discussions
5. See Corporate Governance, CLS, http://www.cls-group.com/About/CG/Pages/
default.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. See About Us, CLS, http://www.cls-group.com/About/Pages/default.aspx (last
visited Feb. 17, 2014); see also Principal En Banc Brief for CLS Bank Int'l and
CLS Servs., Ltd. at 4, CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d 1269 (No. 2011-1301) [herein-
after Principal En Banc Brie]].
9. Principal En Banc Brief, supra note 8, at 4.
10. En Banc Response Brief of Defendant-Appellant Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. at
4, CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d 1269 (No. 2011-1301).
11. See Members, CLS, http://www.cls-group.com/Membership/Community/
Pages/CLSMembers.aspx?cid=N (last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (listing National
Australia Bank as a settlement member).
12. See About Us, ALICE CORPORATION, http://www.alicecorp.com/fsaboutus.
html (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
13. See CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1274.
14. Id.
15. Complaint at 13, CLS Bank, Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. (CLS 1), 768 F. Supp.
2d 221 (No. 07-974).
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continued for several years, and Alice sent additional letters, eventually stat-
ing that it "regards CLS as willfully infringing its intellectual property."16 On
May 24, 2007, CLS filed an action in the D.C. District Court for a declara-
tory judgment of non-infringement, patent invalidity, and patent unenforce-
ability.17 CLS alleged that Alice "does not operate any active exchange
services or compete with CLS in any market," and classified Alice as a "non-
practicing entity that seeks to exact licensing revenue from CLS."I8 CLS
claimed that the disputed patents "broadly claim the use of an intermediary
or middleman to mitigate settlement risk in financial transactions," and that
these claims "seek to monopolize an abstract idea that has long been under-
stood to be a part of financial intermediation"-the idea of escrow.' 9 Relying
on the reasoning in Parker v. Flook,20 CLS asserted that Alice's method
claims are not patent-eligible, because they lack an "inventive concept" be-
yond the abstract idea on which the claim is based, and an abstract idea
cannot transform into patentable material by "[a]dding conventional, well-
understood elements" to it.21 Addressing the issue of whether the classifica-
tion of a claim should affect the assessment of patent eligibility under § 101,
CLS argued that all of the statutory invention classes (process, machine,
manufacture, and composition of matter)22 require the same "threshold scru-
tiny as a method claim, including the inventive concept requirement."23 In
CLS's view, evaluating the system and media claims based on their underly-
ing inventions renders them patent-ineligible as abstract ideas in the same
manner that the method claims fail.24
Ill. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE HISTORY
After CLS filed suit in the district court Alice counterclaimed, alleging
that CLS infringed Alice's patents. Both parties "filed cross-motions for
summary judgment on whether the asserted claims were eligible subject mat-
ter under § 101."25 After the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bilski v.
Kappos 26 in June 2010, both parties renewed their cross-motions for sum-
16. Id. at 14.
17. Id. at 1.
18. Principal En Banc Brief, supra note 8, at 5.
19. Id. at 6, 8.
20. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
21. Principal En Banc Brief, supra note 8, at 9-10.
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
23. Principal En Banc Brief, supra note 8, at 10.
24. Id. at 10-Il.
25. CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1293 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
26. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
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mary judgment.27 On March 9, 2011, the D.C. District Court held that the
patent claims were "directed to an abstract idea," and granted CLS's motion
for summary judgment.28 Alice appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, and on July 9, 2012, a three-judge panel reversed the district court's
holding, classifying the claims as patent-eligible.29 CLS filed petition for a
rehearing en banc, which the Federal Circuit Court granted.30 The en banc
court upheld the district court's holding.3' Alice then filed petition for certio-
rari with the Supreme Court.32
IV. EN BANC COURT'S HOLDING AND RATIONALE
The en banc court's holding consisted of a two-sentence per curiam
opinion affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
CLS.33 A majority of the court, seven of the ten judges, held that Alice's
method and computer-readable media claims were not directed to patent-eli-
gible subject matter under § 101.34 The court was equally divided on the
issue of whether Alice's system claims were directed to patent-eligible sub-
ject matter,35 by default upholding the district court's decision on this issue.
As evidenced by the numerous amicus briefs,36 attorneys, patent hold-
ers, and technology companies across the country had significant interest in
the disposition of this case. Most were anticipating that the court would fi-
nally clarify the appropriate tests to apply in determining if a claim covers
patent eligible material under § 101. Judge Lourie acknowledged the need
for "a consistent, cohesive, and accessible approach to the § 101 analysis-a
framework that will provide guidance and predictability for patent applicants
and examiners, litigants, and the courts." 37 Despite agreement that a determi-
native framework is needed, the judges could not agree on what that frame-
work should consist of. Instead, no consensus was achieved and several
27. CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1275.
28. Id.
29. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. (CLS II), 685 F.3d 1341, 1341-42,
1356, reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 484 F. App'x 559 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
30. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 484 F. App'x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
31. CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1273.
32. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 2013
WL 4768483 (No. 13-298).
33. CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1273 (per curiam).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1171-73 (stating that twenty-four amicus briefs were filed with the Fed-
eral Circuit Court of Appeals related to this case).
37. CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1277 (Lourie, J., concurring).
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incompatible standards were put forward, none of which carries precedential
authority.38
Assessment of recent decisions issued by the Federal Circuit yields two
predominate § 101 methods of evaluation-the "coarse filter" (or "mani-
festly evident") test and the "inventive concept" approach. The coarse filter
approach allows broad latitude to patent claims, and generally finds them as
directed to patent-eligible subject matter unless they obviously fall within a
statutory or judicial exception, such as a disembodied abstract idea. Chief
Judge Rader has described patent eligibility under § 101 as "a 'coarse' gauge
of the suitability of broad subject matter categories for patent protection" and
explained that "subject matter eligibility is merely a threshold check."39 He
defines abstractness of a claim as a disqualifying characteristic when it "ex-
hibit[s] itself so manifestly as to override the broad statutory categories of
eligible subject matter and the statutory context that directs primary attention
on the patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act."40 On the other hand,
the "inventive concept" approach calls for something more than "simply ap-
pending conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality, to laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."41 Judge O'Malley explained
that "[t]he key distinction . . . is between claims that recite ineligible subject
matter, and no more, and claims to specific inventive applications of that
subject matter."42 The Supreme Court advanced this view in assessing § 101
abstractness claims in Parker v. Flook, where it held that the application of a
known mathematical formula was not patentable, because that application
lacked inventiveness.43 In Flook, the Court rejected the respondent's argu-
ment that inventiveness should be evaluated under §§ 102 and 103, rather
than § 101.44
V. ANALYSIS
Unfortunately, the en banc CLS Bank opinions did little to clarify how
coarse or fine the filter for claims of abstractness under § 101 should be. The
judges advanced multiple incompatible theories that expose their disagree-
ment on how the law should be applied.
38. See id. at 1292, n.] (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that "nothing said today beyond our judgment has the weight of
precedent").
39. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1339, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
40. Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
41. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1300
(2012).
42. PerkinElmer, Inc. v. Intema Ltd., 496 F. App'x 65, 68 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
43. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 1978.
44. See id. at 592-93.
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A. Inventive Concept Test
Judge Lourie, joined by four other judges, advocates for the "inventive
concept" test in evaluating patent eligibility claims. Although the categories
of patent-eligible subject matter are broad, they are limited by three judicially
created exceptions: laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas.45
In reviewing common themes in Supreme Court precedent, Lourie identifies
"guideposts" to an approach that will provide predictability in the law-one
which "turns primarily on the practical likelihood of a claim preempting a
fundamental concept."46 He explains that the foremost objective in applying
the common law exceptions should be to "[g]uard[ ] against the wholesale
preemption of fundamental principles."47 Claims that are patent-eligible
"should not be coextensive with a natural law, natural phenomenon, or ab-
stract idea," but rather "must include ... substantive limitations that ... add
'significantly more' to the basic principle, with the result that the claim cov-
ers significantly less."48 The Supreme Court foundational guideposts that
Lourie identifies are to: (1) avoid "overly formalistic approaches to subject-
matter eligibility that invite manipulation by patent applicants,"49 (2) use a
"flexible, claim-by-claim approach to subject-matter eligibility that avoids
rigid line drawing," such as the "machine-or-transformation" test,50 (3) give
issued patent claims a presumption of validity,51 and (4) recognize that an
abstract idea is not transformed into a machine by "merely adding existing
computer technology."52
Within this framework, if a claimed invention is a process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter per the requirements of the statute,
Lourie determines if a judicially created exception (law of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract idea) applies.53 If an exception applies, then the claim
is ineligible under § 101.54 This determination is difficult to apply, particu-
larly with respect to abstract ideas, because there is a lack of consensus on
what an abstract idea actually is. Lourie suggests a process to help determine
if a claim poses any risk of preempting an abstract idea by first identifying
and defining the fundamental concept in the claim.55 Next, evaluate the bal-
45. CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1276-77 (Lourie, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 1277.




51. CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1284 (Lourie, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 1291-92.
53. Id. at 1277.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1282.
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ance of the claim to determine if it contains "additional substantive limita-
tions that narrow, confine, or otherwise tie down the claim so that, in
practical terms, it does not cover the full abstract idea itself."56 This step is
looking for something "beyond the mere recitation of a disembodied funda-
mental concept" and is referred to as an "inventive concept."57 Lourie ex-
plains that an inventive concept "must be 'a product of human ingenuity'"
and "a genuine human contribution to the claimed subject matter."58 The
"human contribution must represent more than a trivial appendix to the un-
derlying abstract idea" and is not "merely tangential, routine, well-under-
stood, or conventional."59 The human contribution cannot be a token or
trivial limitation, a "vague limitation[ ] cast in 'highly general language,'" or
be a "bare field-of-use limitation."60 Performing these steps of evaluation to
Alice's claims in dispute, Lourie concludes that all of the claims are patent-
ineligible abstract ideas.61
B. Meaningful Limitations
Chief Judge Rader wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part, agreeing with Judge Lourie that the judicially-created excep-
tions for claims drawn to laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas
are not patent eligible.62 However, Rader suggests that a close inspection of
the text of the statute, as well as the legislative history, yields a conclusion
that these exceptions should be narrowly construed,63 and a "challenge to the
eligibility of the subject matter must be proven by clear and convincing evi-
dence." 64 He argues that Congress intended § 101 to cast a wide net, noting
that the language, "uses expansive categories and modifies them with the
word 'any,"' indicating that "Congress plainly contemplated that the patent
laws would be given wide scope."65 Rader interprets the Supreme Court's
opinion in Diamond v. Diehr to clarify that the evaluation of a claim for
56. Id.
57. CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1282 (Lourie, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 1283.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1284.
62. Id. at 1297 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293).
63. CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1303 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
64. Id. at 1304-05.
65. Id. at 1294.
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novelty is governed by § 102 rather than § 101,66 refuting Judge Lourie's
premise that inventiveness or "more than novelty" is to be evaluated under
§ 101.67 While the Supreme Court has recognized that "the § 101 patent-
eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes over-
lap,"68 it has also given support to Rader's assessment by "declin[ing] the [ ]
invitation to substitute §§ 102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the better estab-
lished inquiry under § 101."69
In agreement with Lourie, Rader holds that a "court must consider the
asserted claim as a whole when assessing [patent] eligibility" and "consider
the actual language of each claim," rather than "go hunting for abstrac-
tions."70 The danger in breaking down the claims rather than evaluating them
as a whole is that "[a]ny claim can be stripped down, simplified, generalized,
or paraphrased to remove all of its concrete limitations, until at its core,
something that could be characterized as an abstract idea is revealed."71
Taken to the extreme, the decomposition of claims would "make all inven-
tions unpatentable because all inventions can be reduced to underlying prin-
ciples of nature which, once known, make their implementation obvious."72
To avoid this untenable result the evaluation of the claim should be based on
"whether [it] seeks to patent an idea itself, rather than an application of that
idea"73 and whether the claim "includes meaningful limitations restricting it
to an application, rather than merely an abstract idea."74
Applying Rader's interpretation, because the system claims are inte-
grated using machines and include other steps to enable transactions, they
cannot be disembodied abstract ideas.75 In evaluating the method claims, he
inquires "whether the recited steps are inherent in an escrow and claimed at a
high level of generality, such that in fact the claim is not to a practical appli-
66. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190-191 (1981); CLS Bank Int'l, 717
F.3d at 1294 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. See CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F. 3d at 1294 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating "whether a new process, machine, and so on is "in-
ventive" is not an issue under Section 101; the condition for 'more' than nov-
elty is contained only in Section 103").
68. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304
(2012).
69. Id.
70. CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1298 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
71. Id.
72. Id. (quoting Diamond, 450 U.S. at 189 n.12).
73. CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1299 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
74. Id. at 1299-1300.
75. Id. at 1309-10.
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cation of the concept of an escrow, but in effect claims the abstract concept
of an escrow."76 Concluding that "each step [of the method claims] individu-
ally recites merely a general step inherent within the concept of an escrow"
and describes "the general and theoretical concept of using a neutral interme-
diary in exchange transactions to reduce risk that one party will not honor the
deal,"77 Rader found that these method claims do embrace an abstract
concept.
C. Evaluate the Claim as a Whole and a Call for Congressional
Action
Attuned to the concerns of several of the amici curiae,78 Judge Moore
asserts that "[h]olding that all these claims are directed at no more than an
abstract idea gives staggering breadth to what is meant to be a narrow judi-
cial exception" and would be "the death of hundreds of thousands of patents,
including all business method, financial system, and software patents as well
as many computer implemented and telecommunications patents."79 She be-
lieves the "inventive concept" approach advanced by Judge Lourie is errone-
ous, because it fails to evaluate the claim as a whole, and echoing Chief
Judge Rader's concern, recognizes that any claim can be effectively stripped
down to an underlying abstract idea.80 Judge Linn calls for Congress to ad-
dress the judicial divide in evaluating the unique challenges software patents
present. Congress could "limit their life by limiting the term of such patents,"
or it could "limit the scope of software patents by requiring functional
claiming."81
D. Plain Language of the Statute
Judge Newman's opinion concurs in part and dissents in part. She pro-
poses that the court reaffirm three basic principles relating to § 101 in order
to stabilize its application and continue to apply it in accordance with statute
and precedent. First, "the court should hold that § 101 is an inclusive state-
ment of patent-eligible subject matter" and reaffirm that an evaluation of
abstract preemption is more appropriately handled when applying "the laws
of novelty, utility, prior art, obviousness, description, enablement, and speci-
ficity."82 Second, "the court should hold that the form of the claim does not
76. Id. at 1311-12.
77. Id. at 1312.
78. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Int'l Bus. Machines Corp. on Rehearing en
banc in Support of Neither Party, CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717
F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (No. 2011-1301), 2012 WL 6799778, at *18-19.
79. CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1313 (Moore, J., dissenting in part).
80. Id. at 1315.
81. Id. at 1333 (Linn, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1322 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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determine § 101 eligibility," eliminating the opportunity for clever drafts-
manship to redeem an otherwise ineligible claim.83 Finally, "[t]he court
should confirm that experimental use of patented information is not
barred."84 In summary, Newman proposes that to conform with legislative
intent "the court [should] return to the statute, and hold that when the subject
matter is within the statutory classes in § 101, eligibility is established."85
E. Additional Reflections of Chief Judge Rader
In an unanticipated move, Chief Judge Rader published "additional re-
flections" to voice his concern and surprise with the way his colleagues have
struggled with the disposition of this case. 86 He advocates for consulting the
statute, and reiterates his belief that inventions should be evaluated on their
merits, "not on the basis of undefined and unproven judicial abstractions like
'abstractness' or 'preemption."87
VI. CONCLUSION
As explained by Judge Newman, the court, rather than providing clear
guidance, has "propounded at least three incompatible standards, devoid of
consensus, serving simply to add to the unreliability and cost of the system of
patents as an incentive for innovation."88 With the diversity of opinions about
how the courts should evaluate claims under § 101, the disposition of any
patent case heard by the Federal Circuit will likely "depend on the random
selection of the panel."89 Lower courts and litigants have opportunities to
choose from whichever line of cases best supports their argument; with the
current state of the law, both sides of any § 101 dispute have plausible argu-
ments. Indeed, although none of the opinions in CLS Bank carry any prece-
dential value, other courts have already chosen from the various tests
described in this opinion and applied them to cases they are hearing, prolifer-
ating inconsistent application of the law and a lack of predictability. While
each of the opinions in this case brings in Supreme Court precedent to sup-
port its position, the variance in application of this precedence is a good
indicator that the rules the Supreme Court has established are not clear. Rec-
ognizing the need for clarification, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1326 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
86. See id. at 1334 (additional reflections of Rader, C.J.).
87. Id.




for this case. 90 Inventors, patent agents, and attorneys anxiously await the
Court's ruling, expecting that it will define the appropriate method of patent
eligibility evaluation and restore the consistency and integrity of the judicial
process.
90. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013).
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